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The organizers of this Workshop have assigned a title to this paper, and I 
have stuck to it, at least in the sub-title. I have however in the superscription 
brought in the factor of incentive, with the implication that this can usefully 
concentrate our discussion on the topic.
I do this for two reasons. Firstly, because of the centrality of incentive. The 
background paper for this Workshop states its over-all objective as being the 
provision of “strategic advice on sustainable use and the interplay between 
local and global benefits in biodiversity.” 1 In emphasizing this interplay our 
organizers have put their finger on the critical nexus which largely determines 
the success or failure of sustainable use initiatives at both levels. “Use” can 
be defined as “the derivation of benefit,” 2 but the incentives which determine 
preferences for the mode of use vary significantly from global to local levels. 
Unless these incentives are made compatible the necessary collaboration for 
their attainment will be lacking. Bromley comments that:
“Incentive compatibility is established when local inhabitants acquire 
an economic interest in the long-run viability o f an ecosystem that is 
important to people situated elsewhere. ... Such ecosystems represent 
benefit streams for both parties: those in the industrialized North who 
seek to preserve biodiversity and those who must make a living amid 
this genetic resource. ” 3
Without incentive compatibility stasis occurs, since each party has an 
operational veto over the other. Through policy, legislation and fiscal controls 
governments and international agencies can deny local people the 
organizational conditions necessary for the attainment of their conservation 
incentives. Through their in-place location and de facto managerial status 
local people can render external initiatives futile. The central challenge is, 
therefore, to transform such initiatives into sets of congruent, although not 
necessarily identical, incentives.
My second reason is that by highlighting incentive I can conveniently talk 
about sociological and anthropological dimensions without having to resort to 
pedantic disciplinary concepts and idiom. Incentives for collaboration and 
conformity in social interaction lie at the heart of what sociology and 
anthropology are about. Social organization seeks to accommodate diverse 
incentives in institutions which enhance their potential for synergy and 
modulate their potential for fission. In the arena of natural resource use,
where the nature of these resources demands collective management, the 
health of these institutions determine whether use will be sustainable or not. 
We cannot therefore adequately consider sustainability solely in ecological 
terms. Sustainable use requires sustainable institutions to manage such use.
2. The Tale
At this point I want to digress from analytic assertions and tell a tale. It is not 
a “fishy tale” or one that is false, since it is a faithful, if condensed, narrative of 
a local discussion on wildlife management which I heard earlier this year. I 
introduce it here since in its brief span of two hours the discussion brought out 
a range of statements which serve as pointers for our understanding of 
conservation incentives.
My tale is drawn from a meeting between the Chapoto Ward Wildlife 
Committee and international visitors held in Zimbabwe in February of this 
year. Chapoto Ward is an administrative sub-unit of the Guruve District, 300 
square kilometres in area and sandwiched in between national parks estate 
land on the south and west, the Mozambique border on the east and the 
Zambezi River which forms a boundary with Zambia on the north .4 Its wildlife 
committee arises from the ward’s inclusion in Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE 
Programme, a national programme which seeks to encourage rural 
development and sustainable natural resource use through the devolution of 
management responsibility and access rights to “producer communities.” 5 To 
date the expansion of the Programme has rested largely on the exploitation of 
high-value species through sport hunting, concessions being leased to 
commercial safari operators. Although formally introduced in 1989, the 
Programme did not achieve implementational momentum in Chapoto until 
1992. By 1996 wildlife had become the largest collective economic enterprise 
of the ward with revenues equating at household levels to those of cash 
cropping.
A party of two trustees and regional representatives of an international donor 
foundation constituted the visitors. Their main objective was to visit a similar 
“community-based” wildlife management project 20 km. to the east in 
Mozambique which the foundation was supporting but since they had to pass 
through Chapoto on their way they requested a meeting with the Wildlife 
Committee to gain information on the CAMPFIRE Programme. This was 
arranged, and at the appointed day and hour the visitors arrived at the local 
school where the Wildlife Committee and about 40 other community members 
awaited them.
The chairman of the Wildlife Committee opened the meeting by outlining the 
background and history of the Programme in Chapoto. Being an astute 
politician he put the Programme forward in its best light. For decades of 
colonialism the people of Chapoto had suffered government neglect, without 
the roads, schools and clinics which communities closer to the capital had 
received. Living in an agriculturally marginal environment they had had to
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eke out an existence by the cultivation of riverine alluvium, supplementing 
their diet with foraging and hunting. Even hunting was however difficult, since 
government claimed the wildlife which raided their fields and gardens as its 
own. Local hunters were subject to harassment and arrest by National Parks 
staff. Wildlife had become an unmitigated liability for all, except for the few 
poachers who were adept enough to evade detection.
With the coming of the Programme things had changed. Wildlife had become 
a collective asset, to be communally managed. Poaching had dropped and 
wildlife populations had increased, since individual off-takes were a theft of 
communal property and the community had the knowledge and peer pressure 
mechanisms to suppress deviance. Revenues from the sale of their wildlife 
had escalated annually and they had built a school, clinic and a grinding mill 
from the proceeds.
One of the foundation’s trustees opened the question time. “We are 
pleased,” she said, "to learn that you are getting large sums from your wildlife 
which has contributed dramatically to your development. But what is the 
impact of this exploitation on the biodiversity of your area? How do you count 
your animals to ensure that you are not driving certain species to extinction?”
After some complex phrases were used by the interpreter to translate the 
word “biodiversity” into the local language, the chairman rose to reply. With a 
smile he commented, “We know that you people from overseas want to count 
animals by aeroplane, and have many papers with figures before animals can 
be used. But I must be honest and tell you that we do not count each of our 
animals. Even if we had an aeroplane, we could not count animals in the 
thick bush here. But we know that wildlife populations have increased 
because we see more of them and they are raiding our fields more intensively 
than before."
“But,” he continued, “you should know that a general increase in wildlife is not 
our main concern. Yes, we like to see more kudu and bushbuck around, but 
they are not central for our management objectives. What we are really 
concerned with are two species: elephant and buffalo. They are our focus, 
because it is these two species that produce high safari revenues. Since they 
are so important we monitor them closely.” “The way we monitor them," he 
said, “is by watching trends. And to examine trends we look at trophy quality. 
Each trophy taken is carefully measured; for elephant it is tusk weight, for 
buffalo the horns are sized by Rowland Ward measurements. These 
measurements are taken in each instance by the safari operator, the National 
Parks staff and our own game scouts. Since 1992 we have kept these 
records and over time can determine trends in trophy quality. If you want to 
see paper with lots of figures,” he added with a twinkle in his eye, “we can 
show it to you.”
By this time the chairman was full stride. “Now,” he said, “if we see that 
trophy quality is improving we increase the quota slightly for the following 
year. But if we see that it is dropping we decrease the quota since quality is a
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greater determinant of our safari revenues than quantity. We want to 
continue to receive high wildlife revenues indefinitely, and limiting quotas is 
our investment in the future. In our last assessment,” he went on, “we saw 
that buffalo trophies were continuing to improve and so we increased the 
quota. However, we saw that tusk size for elephant trophies were declining 
and so we have cut the quota.”
“What about generating income from your wildlife through photographic 
tourism?” was the next question from the visitors. “By all means,” replied 
another committee member, “but it is difficult to show tourists elephant and 
buffalo in our thick bush. However, we can show them rare birds, and visitors 
are interested in the beauty and fishing that they find on the Zambezi. We 
have already leased land on the river to two tourist operators and we are 
maintaining the riverine habitat and restricting settlement patterns.”
A number of other questions were posed on issues like problem animal 
control, strategies in times of drought, compensation for crop depredation, 
control of fishing and wood-cutting, the ivory trade and locally managed 
tourism. To each the community had a reply which showed insight and 
previous discussion. When asked about their Mozambican neighbours the 
Committee commented: “They have copied our programme and now their 
animals are increasing. Since these animals know nothing about borders 
they move back and forth between us and we must now co-ordinate our 
management with them, and also with the Zambians. This would not be 
difficult, since we meet them and drink with them every weekend. The 
problem is that our governments don’t like us freely crossing these borders.”
“What are your other problems?” was the final question. “There are three 
main ones,” was the reply. “Firstly, this business of managing wildlife takes 
time and transport. We have to constantly meet with the safari operator, 
National Parks and the District Council. Secondly, it is difficult to manage our 
money. We are not trained in book-keeping and there is no bank here.”
But, for the community, the biggest problem was uncertainty about the future. 
“We don’t really know how long government will allow us to keep these 
animals and the revenues they generate. We don’t know how long 
government will allow us to lease sites on the Zambezi and keep the 
proceeds. Government knows, as we have learned, that these things are 
extremely valuable and government may take them back. If that were to 
happen we would abandon our quotas and self-imposed restrictions and take 
what we can without being caught.” This was the sting to my tale, and with it 
the meeting closed.
My tale is too brief to cover all aspects of Chapoto’s sustainable use 
programme. The Wildlife Committee’s presentation did not reveal the internal 
divisions which exist within the community or the ongoing disputes it has with 
the district council, since these are not matters to be discussed with visitors. 
However, the dialogue I have narrated does illustrate loci of incentive
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divergence which are of general relevance for this Workshop. I mention five 
below.
3. Loci of Incentive Dissonance
3.1 Values and Goals
Underlying our narrative two sets of values can be discerned. The visitors 
were concerned with species preservation and biodiversity. The people of 
Chapoto were concerned with sustainable productivity. This is not surprising, 
given the cultural and economic location of each party. For those located in 
urban and industrialized society wild life and habitat has little direct economic 
significance and emphasis is placed on the intrinsic or recreational values 
derived from these resources. Our definitions of conservation are couched in 
abstract terms such as “biodiversity” and “ecosystem maintenance” and our 
objectives become those of the maintenance of species and habitats for 
aesthetic, recreational or scientific purposes. Frequently our strategy is that 
of creating state-run protected areas for “core conservation,” with the adjunct 
of fostering sustainable use outside such areas in recognition that rural 
peoples effectively determine the health of most of the world’s biodiversity 
and demand “equity” in access to its benefits.
For rural farmers and pastoralists where the presence of wild land and wildlife 
has important economic implications, conservation incentives take a different, 
more instrumental form. Conservation is for them an investment (in direct of 
opportunity costs) for present and future value, the goal being the 
maintenance or enhancement of their livelihoods. Sustainable use is 
conservation, whether it involves regulated off-take of biological productivity 
or the designation of areas for tourism enterprises.
There is nothing inherently incompatible in the two incentive profiles I have 
just described. The differences between them can be seen as differences in 
means-end sequencing, the one stance being livelihood enhancement as a 
means to conservation and the other being conservation as a means to 
continued well-being. Dissonance arises when the two are brought together 
in one arena of action and where one stance is accorded what Hirschman has 
called “privileged problem” status.6 At present the tendency is for
international intrinsic and existence valuations to be accorded higher order 
level status and for project strategies to regard local and instrumental 
conservation incentives as lower level factors to be co-opted in the pursuit of 
these values. This does not work. Aside from their inherent merits, local 
incentives have a powerful veto dimension. Unless they are accommodated, 
international values and goals will be subverted by local responses ranging 
from defiance to covert non-compliance.
If the GEF and the CBD take this point seriously, they will need to re-think 
their conceptual and programmatic compartmentalizations. The CBD, for 
instance, by virtue of the language of the Convention considers the concepts 
of conservation, sustainable use and equity as three distinct and separate 
issues. As a result, activities associated with each are developed separately.
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Local perspectives roll these three into one interactive bundle and 
programmatic interventions are unlikely to work if they are not responsive to 
this synthesis.
3.2 Proprietorship
Our tale underlines the importance that the people of Chapoto ascribe to local 
proprietorship. The conferment by the state to them of a direct authority over 
the use and benefit of these land and resources had been the catalyst to 
mobilize their conservation incentives, stimulated a sense of responsibility 
and launched them into a new mode of management requiring skills in 
handling the exchange values of their natural resources. The conferment of 
proprietorship had, however, been one of programme, not legal entitlement.
It was therefore incomplete, lacking tenure or long-term security of access. 
This insecurity led them into gloomy prognostications of the future. Without 
proprietorship their incentives for conservation would falter and fail.
Local incentives thus indicate devolution in proprietorship. Unfortunately, 
establishment incentives tend to reset it. These incentives include the 
bureaucratic mind, disposed to the centralization of authority and the 
technocratic mind, which is disposed to see devolution as the surrender of 
professional management to the vagaries of cost/benefit decisions by 
unsophisticated peasants. They also include the appropriative incentives of 
central political elite and their private sector allies. Whatever the specific 
configuration of incentive is, the result is commonly that “community-based” 
resource management initiatives turn out to be efforts to co-opt or bribe local 
peoples while authority still effectively remains firmly in state hands. This is 
institutionally fatal, since authority and responsibility are separated.
These two incentive sets can be harmonized. The answer lies neither in 
community autarky or state autocracy. It lies instead in as a redefinition and 
acceptance of complementary and mutually supportive roles, local 
organization being given the authority and responsibility necessary to carry 
through local incentives and the state accepting a supra-local coordinative 
role with its arbitrative, regulatory and extension functions.
This is largely a political issue to be negotiated in national arenas. 
International agencies do, however, have a responsibility to facilitate this 
redefinition. Firstly, projects and programmes which address this issue with 
clear direction should be given priority. Secondly, international agencies can 
facilitate policy debate on the issue, using the networks of professional and 
academic skills existing in national and regional networks.
3.3 Science
My third locus of incentive dissonance is science - the views of what it is and 
how it should be used. The Wildlife Chairman’s wry reference to counting 
animals by aeroplane and “having many papers with figures before animals 
can be used” is a colourful outsider’s view on international conservationism’s 
reliance on high-tech quantitative modelling to monitor and predict ecological 
status. The incentives for this alliance between ecological science and
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international environmentalism are strong. Scientists gain a powerful 
clientele,7 while governments and agencies “seek a scientific algorithym to 
reduce subjective decision-taking on whether or not to sanction certain uses,” 
with the aim of reducing uncertainty in policy and practice.8
Rural farmers such as those in Chapoto have a similar goal. Dealing with 
uncertainty is a continuing factor in their lives and risk-aversion a pervasive 
feature of their farming strategies. When given the opportunity, they use a 
methodology of the highest scientific credentials - experimentation. 
Chapoto’s monitoring of trophy trend is elegant in its simplicity, robust in its 
empiricism and striking in its tight application to management decisions. It is 
also pregnant with potential for the development of locally-based 
environmental science which moves beyond issues of species off-take. Such 
science, flexible in its foci and dynamic in its analysis, is far more important 
than the static domain of “indigenous technical knowledge,” the box to which 
we condescendingly assign local insight and experience.
People like those at Chapoto have problems with the scientific environmental 
technicism of governments and international agencies. They do not have the 
resources to conduct it themselves and its conduct by others involves a 
significant loss of control. They see it as a device which can be applied to 
stop use which their own science indicates is viable. And they have a healthy 
scepticism of its ability to produce the predictive certainties which are 
expected of it. In this they have allies amongst environmental scientists 
concerned with evolutionary biology and system approaches to ecology which 
extend the scope of investigation beyond physical and biotic data to include 
the structures and dynamics of human activity. Scientists in this school 
recognize the inherently contingent nature of scientific knowledge and 
emphasize its role as an actor, with policy and management, in social 
experiment.9 They recognize that sustainability is a social goal, not a “fixed 
end-point to be reached but a direction that guides constructive change." 10 
As Fuentes puts it, “ ... sustainable development is a trajectory within certain 
bounds, rather than a particular state.”11
This perspective on professional science’s epistemology and role is cognate 
to the local science my tale has illustrated. In its applied form it has “emerged 
regionally in new forms of resource and environmental management where 
uncertainty and surprises became an integral part of an anticipated set of 
adaptive responses.” 12 Dissonance remains, however, where bureaucracies 
retain the expectation that science can provide a priori certainties. As 
Constanza remarks, “ ... most environmental regulations ... demand certainty 
and when scientists are pressured to supply this non-existent commodity 
there is not only frustration and poor communication, but mixed messages in 
the media as well.”13 One can also add that this pressure is a perverse 
incentive for the integrity of science itself, since it carries with it the temptation 
to assert as definitive that which is tentative.
The cognate nature of new directions in conservation biology and local 
science, both acknowledging indeterminacy and emphasizing 
experimentation and adaptation, holds vast potential for improving
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conservation science and enhancing its impact on policy and practice. It is as 
yet under-exploited, with old oppositional constructs still common. Science is 
still regarded as specialized domain outside the realm and mandate of local 
people. Our language often betrays this, as when for instance we read the 
following criterion for sustainable use: “Governments involve local people in 
decisions affecting the use while continuing to base management decisions 
on science.”14 The GBF and the CBD should take pains to avoid the 
dichotomizations and condescension of this stance and strive to build synergy 
between professional and citizen science.
Specifically, the GBF and the CBD should invest significantly in the facilitation 
of a new profile for the nature and role of science and its insertion into the 
policy and practice of sustainable use. One of the best mechanisms to 
achieve this is through the sponsorship of debate involving rural managers, 
policy makers and in scholars at regional and national levels, since these are 
the arenas where professional and local science interface. lUCN’s 
Sustainable Use Initiative has taken this decentralized approach over the past 
four years with highly positive results.15
3.4 Socio-Ecoloaical Topography
Potential “lack-of-fit” between social and ecological topography can constitute 
another source of incentive dissonance. The institutional requirements of a 
local natural resource management regime such as Chapoto include social 
cohesion, locally sanctioned authority and co-operation and compliance 
reliant primarily on peer pressure.16 This implies a tightly knit interactive 
social unit spatially located to permit this. However, while social topography 
suggests “small-scale” regimes, ecological considerations tend to mandate 
“large-scale” regimes. This may arise from ecosystem considerations or when 
key resources are widely dispersed or mobile, as in the case of Chapoto's 
elephant and buffalo. Economic considerations may also dictate “large-scale” 
regimes where market factors require that several proprietorial units manage 
and tender their resources collectively.17 There is no inherent reason why 
social and ecological topographies cannot be harmonized, although this 
requires context-specific institutional engineering through negotiation. Often 
this will involve nested systems of collective enterprise between proprietorial 
units. Built upward in this fashion such larger ecosystem units of 
management have a built-in incentive to spread, as in the case of Chapoto’s 
aspirations for collaboration with their Mozambican and Zambian neighbours.
Dissonance arises when larger ecosystem regimes are imposed rather than 
endogenous. Such impositions in the form of ecologically-determined project 
domains often force together social units which have not negotiated between 
each other or worse still cut through existing social units. In so doing they 
concentrate on ecological sustainability at the cost of ignoring the institutional 
sustainability on which it depends.
The GBF and CBD should keep in mind that project approaches which start 
with a defined land area may not have as much potential as those which start 
with a focus on social units of organization. Such units may effectively
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manage large land areas, and may be in a position to sponsor lateral 
incrementalism through example and mutual interest.
3.5 Project and Programme Implementation
Projects and programmes are the principal, though not exclusive, contexts 
bringing together international and local incentives for sustainable use. 
These contexts juxtapose two cultures of planning and implementation. The 
one is reductionist, bureaucratic, directive and contractual, operating through 
the rigid time and budget frames of a “project cycle.” The other is 
incrementalist, personalized, suasive and consensual, operating through 
experiment and adaptation set in indeterminate time-frames.
These differences have led to the “blueprint or process” debate amongst 
implementational specialists.18 I cannot here deal with all the relevant issues 
and touch on only one, that of time-frames. For various reasons governments 
and donor agencies typically operate in project cycles far more condensed in 
time than that required for the institutional learning which must take place 
before local regimes can harmonize their modes of implementation with those 
of external partners. Such institutional learning goes far beyond the 
impartation of knowledge and skills by external agents. More fundamentally it 
is about experiential adaptation of roles and norms in new circumstances 
within local social units themselves.19 Knowledge and skills required by 
individuals do not suffice on their own; institutional learning is a collective 
process of adaptive interaction responsive to external and internal change. It 
takes time. At whatever point in the learning curve we place Chapoto we 
should bear in mind that their perspectives were the product of a 9 year 
evolution in status and experience.
4. A Concluding Comment
Most of what has been said in this paper is not novel for current debates on 
conservation. However, the points I have made do not seem to have 
reached the threshold of operational prominence they deserve. The loci of 
incentive dissonance mentioned tenaciously remain in a plethora of policy 
and programme examples, largely because of the status asymmetry which 
characterizes “the interplay between local and global benefits in biodiversity.” 
A change in this situation cannot be effected by any simple policy mandate. 
As Adams and Hulme have commented, “In an unpredictable world - 
complex, diverse and contingent, with goals that are constantly refined and 
redefined, the idea that the ‘right policy’ can be identified and then indefinitely 
pursued is an historic artifact.” 20 A change from the current intractibilities of 
incentive dissonance must itself be a process of adaptive management 
involving experiments in new combinations of science, policy and practice. 
The scientific and technical bodies of the GEF and the CBD are well placed to 
facilitate this process, and if they have the vision and resolve to do this they 
can contribute immeasurably to a coalition of international and local 
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